When I first came across 'provable security', I got a rather uncomfortable feeling.
Sometimes, it is rather apparent when authors deliberately attempt to aggrandise their particular field of interest, mainly by inventing deliberately obscure and opaque notation and conventions to try and convince the novice that the subject is an order of magnitude harder than it really is.
Coming from a pure maths background, I came across little of this in my earlier life, as pure maths is about as humble a subject as you can get.
But, with 'provable security', this attempt at embellishment of what are really rather simple ideas struck me.
This observation is also made in Koblitz's paper, along with words of caution regarding the somewhat rash use of the words and phrases 'proof' and 'provable security', when, from a pure maths point of view, these 'proofs of security' are not absolute, but rather defined with regard to specific notions regarding the capabilities of an adversary.
In particular, in the area I am working in (lightweight cryptography), such 'proofs' are of limited use or relevance.
Don't get me wrong - 'provable security' is elegant in it's own way, and makes for an interesting read (if a bit turgid at times). But there is a real and vindicated danger that it can lure outsiders (and insiders) into a false and dangerous sense of security regarding cryptographic constructions.
